1.
Introduction: The Purpose of the Certainty of Objects
Requirement
- For a Trust to exist, A must: (i) hold a specific claim-right
or power; and (ii) be under a duty to B not to use that
claim-right or power for A’s own benefit (unless and to
the extent that A is also a beneficiary of the Trust). In
other words, for a Trust to exist, A must be under the core
Trust duty.
The certainty requirements for a Trust simply reflect the fact that A must be under a duty to B in
relation to a specific right. The certainty of
objects requirement ensures that: (i) A owes a duty to a specific
person; and (ii) A’s duty is certain enough to be
enforced.
The certainty of objects requirement can
sometimes be seen as an inconvenient obstacle that can trip
up a party (A0) trying to set up a Trust. However, it serves
a vital purpose: a court cannot enforce a duty unless that
duty is adequately defined. This point is not peculiar to
Trusts. For example, an agreement between A and B can only
impose a contractual duty on A to B if it is satisfies a
certainty test: the nature of A’s duty to B must be adequately defined.
In understanding the certainty of objects requirement, it is
important to ask what information the court needs in order to enforce A’s supposed duty to B. If that
information is lacking, A’s supposed duty cannot be enforced;
so A will be under no duty to B; so there can be no Trust.
2.
Discretionary Trusts
- A discretionary Trust is a form of Trust (see p 222-4 of
the book): it can exist only if A is under the core Trust
duty.
Example 1a: A0 transfers £100,000
to A subject to a duty: (i) not to use that money for A’s
own benefit; and (ii) to invest the money prudently; and
(iii) at the end of 21 years, to pay any unspent part of
the £100,000 and its income to Oxfam. A0 also stipulates
that, during that 21 years, A can, if he wishes, pay all
or any of the £100,000 and its income to all or any of A0’s
children or grandchildren.
In such a case, there is clearly a Trust: A is under the core
Trust duty. And Oxfam is a beneficiary of that Trust: A
owes the core Trust duty to Oxfam. A0’s children and grandchildren
are not, however, beneficiaries of a Trust: A does not owe
them the core Trust duty. Rather, A has a power: A can,
if he wishes, give all or any of the money to all or any of A0’s
children and grandchildren.
- A discretionary Trust is a particular form of Trust: it exists
where A, in addition to being under the core Trust duty,
has a power to choose how to distribute the benefit of the
right A holds on Trust.
Example 1b: A0 transfers £100,000
to A subject to a duty: (i) not to use that money for A’s
own benefit; and (ii) to pay the money, in equal shares,
to all of A0’s children and grandchildren.
In such a case, there is clearly a Trust: A is under the core
Trust duty. There is no discretionary Trust: A does not
have a power to choose how to distribute the benefit of
the £100,000. Rather, there is a fixed Trust:
A is under a duty to distribute the benefit of the right
held on Trust in a specific way.
Example 1c: A0 transfers £100,000
to A subject to a duty: (i) not to use that money for A’s
own benefit; and (ii) to invest the money prudently; and
(iii) by the end of 21 years, to have distributed that £100,000
and its income, as A sees fit, amongst all or any of A0’s
children or grandchildren.
In such a case, there is a discretionary Trust. A does owe
the core Trust duty to A0’s children and grandchildren;
but A has a power to choose how to distribute the benefit
of the £100,000.
3.
Discretionary Trusts & Certainty of Objects:
The ‘Any Given Person’ Test
Example 2: A0 transfers £100,000
to A subject to a duty: (i) not to use that money for A’s
own benefit; and (ii) to invest the money prudently; and
(iii) by the end of 21 years, to have distributed that £100,000
and its income, as A sees fit, amongst all or any of A0’s
relatives.
In Example 2, there seems to
be a problem. A0 has attempted to set up a discretionary
Trust. However, such a Trust depends on A being under a
duty not to pay any of the money to a person who is not
a relative of A0. But
can a court enforce that duty? For example, let’s say A
chooses to pay out £5,000 to X. Is there a meaningful test
the court can use to decide if X really is a relative of
A0? If not, a key part of A’s intended duty cannot be enforced;
in that case, the intended discretionary Trust cannot exist.
And, if that occurs, A will hold the £100,000 on Resulting
Trust for A0 (or, if A0 has died, for A0’s estate).
We can sum up this point by saying that, for a discretionary
Trust to exist, it must pass the ‘any given person’ test: a court must be able
to tell of any given person (eg X) whether or not that person falls within the
class of those to whom A is permitted to distribute the benefit of the right A
holds on Trust. That ‘any
given person’ test is often referred to as the ‘given postulant’ test. In re
Baden (No 2),
the Court of Appeal considered whether a discretionary Trust for A0’s relatives
could pass that test.
Stamp LJ held that the discretionary Trust was valid. His Lordship
reached that conclusion by taking a very narrow view of
relatives as including only A0’s statutory next of kin (ie
those close relatives specified by statute as being able
to acquire A0’s rights if A0 dies without making a valid
will). Sachs and Megaw LJJ took a much broader
approach to the term ‘relative’, defining it as anyone sharing
an ancestor with A0. That definition seems to cause a problem:
if X claims that he and A0 had the same great-great-great-great-great
grandmother, can the court really test that claim? Sachs
and Megaw LJJ both dealt with that point by saying that
the onus is on X to prove that claim; until X does so, it
must be assumed that X does not share
an ancestor with A0.
The approach of Sachs and Megaw LJJ (assuming X is out of the
permitted class, unless and until X can show otherwise)
seems to make the ‘any given person’ test redundant. For
example, if A0 tries to set up a discretionary Trust in
which A has a power to distribute the benefit of a right
to anyone who is a ‘good person’, we might expect A0’s attempt
to fail: there is no way for a court to tell if X is or
is not a ‘good person’. However, on the approach of Sachs
and Megaw LJJ, we could instead say that the discretionary
Trust is valid Æ it is just that, if X cannot prove he is
a ‘good person’, it will be assumed that he is not such
a person.
It seems that neither Sachs LJ nor Megaw LJ wanted to leave
the law in such a way as to permit there to be a discretionary
Trust in favour of anyone who is a ‘good person’. So each
judge added a further certainty requirement. Sachs LJ stated
that the class of those to whom A can distribute the benefit
of A’s right must be ‘conceptually certain’: that is, it
must be possible to come up with a definition of the class. Practical, evidential problems as to
whether X is or is not within that definition can be dealt
with by applying the simple rule that X is out of the class
until he proves otherwise. So the ‘good person’ discretionary
Trust will be invalid as there is no clear way of defining
that term: it is conceptually uncertain.
In contrast, whilst it may be difficult, or even impossible,
to tell if X is or is not a relative of A0, that evidential
uncertainty will not
defeat the discretionary Trust.
Megaw LJ added a different requirement, stating that a discretionary
Trust can only be valid if there are a ‘substantial number’
of people who are clearly within the class to whom A can
distribute the benefit of A’s right. Again, that requirement can be used to
mean that a ‘good person’ discretionary Trust is invalid,
whereas a ‘relatives’ discretionary Trust is not.
The extra requirements imposed by Sachs
and Megaw LJJ do not assist in fulfilling the purpose of
the ‘any given person’ test: making sure the court can tell
if A distributes the benefit of the right to a person outside
the permitted class. It may be that each requirement instead
aims to ensure that the discretionary Trust makes some practical
sense: for example, if it is not possible to give a conceptually
certain definition to the class, it may well be that no-one
can show he is within that class. Megaw LJ’s requirement
for a ‘substantial number’ to be within the class is of
course quite vague: the point seems to be that, for a discretionary
Trust to make sense, A must have a genuine choice to make
as to who will receive the benefit of A’s right. However,
that point is not always correct: for example, the discretion
in a discretionary Trust could come from A having a power
to decide how much of
the benefit of A’s right a particular individual should
receive.
4.
Discretionary Trusts & Certainty of Objects:
Further Tests
4.1
The ‘full list’ test?
At one point, it was suggested that a discretionary trust could
be valid only if the court could draw up a full list
of the people to whom A is permitted to distribute
the benefit of a right. On that view, in Example
2, a discretionary trust would arise only if it is
possible to draw up a full list of A0’s relatives. However,
in McPhail v Doulton, the House of Lords rejected
that view. It was based on the idea that, if A failed
in his duty to distribute the benefit of the right, a court
would have to step in and decide how to distribute. And,
to avoid favouring any one person, the court would have
to order equal division of the benefit of the right amongst
all members of the class. On that view, a discretionary
trust would become, in effect, like the fixed Trust in Example
1b: so a full list would be necessary.
In McPhail v Doulton,
Lord Wilberforce pointed out that, if A fails in his duty
to distribute the benefit of a right, a court does not
have to order equal division. After all, such equal division could
be one of the worst ways of distributing the benefit of
a right: for example, splitting up a fund of £100,000 equally
among 1,000 people would mean that no one person gains a
substantial benefit from the discretionary trust. So, given
the other means by which the court can step in to execute
a discretionary trust, there is no need to apply the ‘full
list’ test.
4.2
The ‘administrative workability’ test
The fact that a court may need to step in and execute a discretionary
trust does not mean
that a discretionary trust must pass the ‘full list’ test.
Nonetheless, it may have some impact. For example, if the
terms of the attempted discretionary trust mean that there
is no sensible
plan a court could adopt to execute that supposed trust,
then A0’s attempt to set up a discretionary trust must fail.
This point may explain the (rarely relevant) ‘administrative
workability’ test.
For example, in one case, A0 (a council shortly to disappear as
part of a re-organisation) attempted to set up a discretionary
trust (of a large sum of money) for the benefit of all the
former residents of the area covered by that council. The
class of people to whom A could distribute the benefit of
its right would thus include over 2 million people. It was
found that the council’s attempt to set up a discretionary
Trust failed: the planned Trust was ‘administratively unworkable’.
The problem here may be that, if A fails to perform his
duty to distribute, the court will have to step in. And
is there any sensible way order a court could make to distribute
the benefit of A’s right? We have to bear in mind the need
for a court to avoid making the type of contentious political
decision which it is ill-suited to make and which may cause
resentment. Of course, in most cases, no such problems
arise: the ‘administrative workability’ test rarely prevents
an intended discretionary trust from arising.
This explanation of the ‘administrative workability’ test explains
why it applies to discretionary trusts but not to attempts
to give A a power (as in Example
1a). If A chooses not to exercise a power to
distribute the benefit of a right then, as A is under no
duty to do so, a court does not need to step in and order
some form of distribution. There is thus no risk of a court
facing the dilemma that would arise if an administratively
unworkable discretionary trust were allowed to be valid.
4.3
The ‘non-capricious’ test
Although the ‘administrative workability’ test does not apply
to powers, that does not mean that powers are free from
certainty tests. For example if A has a power to distribute
the benefit of a right to all or any of a certain class
of people then, as is the case with a discretionary trust,
A is under a duty not to distribute outside that class.
So, with a power as with a discretionary trust, the ‘any
given person’ test applies: the power is only valid if a court can
tell, should A exercise the power in favour of X, whether
or not X is in the permitted class.
Sometimes, when accepting a power, A also comes under a duty
to act loyally and responsibly when considering whether
to exercise that power. In such a case, for example, A (as
is the case if A holds a right on a discretionary trust)
cannot simply ignore the power: he is under a duty to members
of the class of potential recipients to consider periodically
whether or not to exercise the power. In these cases, A can be said to have
a ‘fiduciary power’: A is not just under the negative duty
not to distribute outside the permitted class; he also has
some positive duties in relation to the power.
It has been held that A0’s attempt to set up such a power will
fail if the intended power is ‘capricious’: if there are
no sensible criteria A can apply in considering whether
and how to exercise his power. This does not mean that, when giving
A the intended fiduciary power, A0 needs to spell out what
factors A should take into account. However, it does mean
that if the supposed power is ‘capricious’ (ie there is
no sensible scheme A can come up with) then A0’s attempt
to give A the power must fail.
Two points are worth noting about this ‘non-capricious’ test.
First, if it is linked to A0’s attempt to impose a duty
on A to act loyally and responsibly when considering whether
to exercise a power, it must apply to an attempt to set
up a discretionary trust: such a duty is a key part of a
discretionary trust. Second, in practice, it is very unlikely
that this test will present a problem: people rarely go
round setting up bizarre powers that cannot be considered
in a sensible way.
4.4
The ‘one person’ test
Example 3: A0, an owner of a
large number of paintings, dies. In his will, he instructs
A (his executor) to allow ‘each of my friends’ to purchase
one of those paintings each, at half its market value.
In such a case, A0 does not attempt to set up a discretionary Trust: A has no power to choose how
to distribute his rights. Rather, each friend of A has a
fixed entitlement. A0 is attempting to make a conditional
gift: if X satisfies a particular condition (if he is a friend of A0) he has
a specific right. Nonetheless, it may seem that there is
still a certainty problem: how can A (or the court) tell
if X is or is not a friend of A0?
However, in re Barlow,
the essential facts of which were identical to Example
3, Browne-Wilkinson J held that the conditional
gift was valid. His Lordship noted that an attempt to set
up a discretionary Trust for ‘friends of A0’ would fail:
applying Sachs LJ’s test in re Baden (No 2), the term ‘friends of A0’ is conceptually uncertain.
However, a conditional gift should be treated differently:
if there was just one person who could clearly show he was,
on any reasonable test, a friend of A0, that person is entitled
to acquire one of the paintings.
The test applied in re Barlow has been criticised.
However, it can be defended. If an attempted discretionary Trust (eg in favour
of ‘friends of A0’) fails a certainty test, then someone who could have
benefitted from A’s power (eg a clear friend of A0) will miss out. But, in any
case, that person only had a chance of
receiving a benefit; he had no legal guarantee. In contrast, if a conditional
gift is found to be invalid when there is a person who definitely stands to
benefit from it, that person is deprived of a definite entitlement: a right
given to him by A0. To avoid that deprivation, the conditional gift must be
valid as long as one person clearly falls within the class of intended
recipients.