
CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	v
Table of Cases	xi
Introduction	1
Section 1—A Society of Risks and Uncertainty	1
Section 2—Uncertainty in Medical Malpractice	4
Section 3—Jurisdictions, Fields of Law, and Methodology	6
Section 4—Structure	9
Chapter 1: Problems in the Proof of Causation	13
Section 1—Proof of Causation	13
A. Common Law	16
1. <i>Factual and Legal Causation</i>	16
2. <i>Factual Causation</i>	18
B. Civil Law	26
Conclusion to Section 1	29
Section 2—Evidence in the Four Jurisdictions	29
A. Burden and Standard of Proof of Causation in Civil Cases	30
1. <i>Burden of Proof</i>	30
2. <i>Standard of Proof</i>	34
(a) In Common Law and the Province of Québec	34
(b) In France	37
3. <i>The Risk of Error</i>	38
B. Inferences in Common Law	39
1. <i>Principle</i>	39
2. <i>Type of Evidence Required</i>	41
3. <i>The Impact</i>	42
C. Factual Presumptions in Civil Law	43
1. <i>Principle</i>	43
2. <i>The Serious, Precise, and Concordant Requirement</i>	44
3. <i>The Effects of Factual Presumptions</i>	45
Conclusion to Section 2	46

Section 3—The Impact of Scientific Uncertainties on the Proof of Causation	46
A. Scientific Uncertainties affecting Causation	48
1. <i>Abstract Causation</i>	49
2. <i>Personal Causation</i>	50
B. Cumulative and Alternative Causal Mechanisms	54
Conclusion to Chapter 1	55
Chapter 2: Flexibility	57
Section 1—Importance and Mutability of the Traditional Standards	58
Section 2—Flexibility and Independence of the Judiciary	59
A. Judicial Independence from Experts’ Opinions	60
B. Independence from Scientific, Mathematical, and Statistical Evidence	64
C. Common Sense, Lay Evidence and Policy	69
Section 3—Flexibility in Light of Expert Controversies	72
Conclusion to Chapter 2	76
Chapter 3: Reversal of the Burden of Proving Causation	77
Section 1—Common Law	77
A. Reversal Prior to <i>McGhee</i>	77
B. <i>McGhee v National Coal Board</i> (1973)	80
1. <i>Lord Wilberforce’s Position</i>	80
2. <i>Rejection of Lord Wilberforce’s Opinion</i>	81
Section 2—Civil Law	84
A. The Indeterminate Defendant	84
B. Reversal in Medical Malpractice	86
Section 3—Critical Analysis	88
Conclusion to Chapter 3	90
Chapter 4: Probabilistic Assessment of Damages	91
Section 1—Loss of Chance	93
A. Statement of the Problem	93
1. <i>The Classic Loss of Chance Cases</i>	94
2. <i>The Debated Use: Medical Loss of Chance Cases</i>	96
B. Position of the Judiciary	97
1. <i>England</i>	98
2. <i>Australia</i>	104
3. <i>Québec and Canada</i>	108
4. <i>France</i>	110
(a) Civil Courts	110
(b) Administrative Courts	113

Section 2—Market-share Liability	114
Section 3—Critical Analysis (Loss of Chance)	117
A. Doctrinal Debate: Arguments in Favour	118
B. Doctrinal Objections	122
1. <i>Distinction From the Classic Cases</i>	122
(a) The Contract–Tort Divide	122
(b) Taking of the Chance	123
(c) Type of Uncertainty	124
(d) State of the Plaintiff when Fault Committed	128
(e) Dependence of the Chance	128
2. <i>Problems in the Evaluation of the Chance</i>	129
3. <i>General Implications of Loss of Chance</i>	131
(a) By-passing the Causation Requirement	131
(b) Proportional Liability in Every Case	133
4. <i>The French Standard of Proof: A Justification?</i>	135
(a) Probabilities and Certainty	135
(b) Degree of Chance Required	138
5. <i>From Substance to Evidence</i>	139
Conclusion to Chapter 4	140
Chapter 5: Inferences of Causation	143
Section 1—Inferences and Factual Presumptions	143
Section 2—The Development of Justifications	146
A. Risk	147
1. <i>Common Law: Increase of the Risk of Damage</i>	147
(a) <i>McGhee v National Coal Board</i> (1973)	148
(b) <i>Wilsher v Essex Health Authority</i> (1988)	152
(c) Subsequent English Case Law	155
(d) Subsequent Australian Case Law	162
(e) Subsequent Canadian Case Law	164
2. <i>Québec</i>	172
(a) Increase of Risk	172
(b) Creation of a Danger	174
3. <i>France</i>	177
(a) <i>Création Fautive d'un Risque</i>	177
(b) <i>Création d'un État Dangereux</i>	178
(c) Increase of Risk	179
B. Negligent Undermining of the Plaintiff's Means of Proof	181
C. Presumptions by Elimination (France)	186
1. <i>Generalities</i>	186
2. <i>HIV Infected Plaintiffs</i>	190

3. <i>Post-transfusion Hepatitis C</i>	193
4. <i>From Factual to Quasi-legal Presumptions</i>	194
5. <i>Administrative Courts and Statutory Intervention</i>	195
D. Others	197
Conclusion to Section 2	198
Section 3—Critical Analysis	199
A. Common Sense Inferences	201
B. Inferential Reasoning Process	205
1. <i>Common Law</i>	205
2. <i>Civil Law</i>	207
3. <i>The Justifications</i>	211
C. Critique of the Justifications	212
1. <i>The Idea of Risk</i>	213
(a) Material Increase of Risk in Common Law	213
(b) Increase of Risk and Creation of a Danger in Civil law	219
2. <i>Negligently Created Causal Uncertainty</i>	221
D. Suggested Approach	226
Conclusion to Chapter 5	228
Final Analysis and Conclusion	229
Section 1—General Review	229
Section 2—Review of the Critique of the Solutions	231
Section 3—The Alternative—Cumulative Causes Distinction	233
Section 4—Flexibility and the Evidential Solution	235
Section 5—Alternative Solutions?	237
Final Conclusion	239
Bibliography	241
Index	255